United Nations S/2014/382

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 23 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stating that Roman Olegovich Katarsky has been appointed alternate representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

14-54362 (E) 300514

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United Nations A/68/894–S/2014/383

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 33 and 38

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Prevention of armed conflict

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 26 May 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the month of April 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tigran **Samvelian**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

14-54358 (E) 100614

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Annex to the letter dated 26 May 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-30 April 2014

1. On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

   Total number of violations — 1,574

   Total number of shots ~ 8,769

   AK ~ 5,408, PK ~ 2,020, SVD ~ 691, DSHK ~ 113, RPK ~ 141, Black arrow ~ 60, Istigall ~ 306, Utyos ~ 16, NSVT ~ 14

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations — 268

   Total number of shots ~ 5,499

   AK ~ 1,617, PK ~ 2,208, SVD ~ 251, DSHK ~ 1,347, RPK ~ 42, Black arrow ~ 34

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1.	1 April	Barekamavan	1555	SVD	4	
2.		Aygepar	2240	AK	4	
3.	2 April	Agarak	1650	AK	4	
4.	3 April	Movses	1020	SVD	1	
5.			1140	DSHK	10	
6.				PK	10	
7.		Barcruni	1035	PK	20	
8.	5 April	N.Karmiraghbyur	1325	DSHK	20	
9.		Aygepar	1840	PK	4	
10.		Kayanavan	2035	AK	8	
11.	6 April	Chinari	0900	SVD	3	
12.			1005	AK	5	
13.		Movses	1655		1	
14.		Agarak	1930		12	
15.			2030		2	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; DSHK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istigall, 14.5 mm machine gun; NSVT, 12.7 mm machine gun.

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
16.		Sarigyugh	2230		5	
17.		Berqaber	2230		4	
18.	7 April	Dovegh	0130	AK	20	
19.		Aygepar	0315	PK	45	
20.			0350		10	
21.			0405		4	
22.			1545	AK	5	
23.	8 April	Movses	0840	Black arrow	1	
24.			1350	DSHK	4	
25.			1600	AK	2	
26.			2030	Black arrow	2	
27.		Chinari	1210	AK	4	
28.		Berdavan	1850		20	
29.		Sev Qar	2240	SVD	7	
30.		Dovegh	2055	AK	20	
31.			2120		15	
32.	9 April	Chinari	1550	AK	4	
33.			1600		10	
34.		Movses	1725		2	
35.		Berqaber	1800	SVD	2	
36.	10 April	Paravaqar	0940	PK	4	
37.		Movses	1100	DSHK	2	
38.			1630	AK	1	
39.			1910		4	
40.		Dovegh	1100		8	
41.			1135		4	
42.		Berdavan	1135		4	
43.		Voskepar	1140		31	
44.		Chinari	1325	Black arrow	3	

No	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
45.	11 April	Movses	1010	Black arrow	1	At 1210 near the village of Horadiz at the borderline with Azerbaijan, in a combat position soldier Harutyun Qirajyan was injured by fragments from the Azerbaijani side.
46.			1805	SVD	1	
47.		Chinari	1025	SVD	1	
48.		Aygepar	1140	SVD	1	
49.			1200	Black arrow	1	
50.			2150	AK	1	
51.		Vazashen	1935	AK	2	
52.		Jil	2115		8	
53.	12 April	Dovegh	1250	AK	20	At 1650 near the village of Leonarkh at the borderline with Azerbaijan, in a combat position soldier Seyran Andranikyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
54.		Aygepar	1425	SVD	1	
55.			1800		6	
56.			1935	PK	17	
57.			1937		9	
58.			1950	SVD	2	
59.			2235	AK	5	
60.			2239		10	
61.		Vazashen	1700		10	
62.		Berqaber	2230		5	
63.			2230		5	
64.	13 April	Khndzorut	1325	AK	2	
65.		Eraskh	1515		8	
66.	14 April	Aygepar	1045-1110	AK	2	
67.				Black arrow	3	
68.			1305	PK	7	
69.			1550	SVD	1	
70.			1635	AK	1	
71.			1750	PK	4	
72.			1815-1840	DSHK	16	
73.			1850-1910		10	
74.			1915-1950		60	
75.			2000-2100		60	

No	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
76.			2100-2200	DSHK	150	
77.				PK	1 300	
78.		Movses	1045-1110	AK	1	
79.			1130	DSHK	9	
80.			1150		4	
81.			1850-1910	PK	60	
82.				DSHK	90	
83.			1915-1950		120	
84.			2000-2100		50	
85.			2100-2200		190	
86.		N.Karmiraghbyur	1045-1110	PK	4	
87.			1150	DSHK	1	
88.			1150	DSHK	1	
89.			1735		4	
90.			1735	PK	4	
91.			1805	DSHK	4	
92.			1815-1840		10	
93.			1850-1910		35	
94.			1915-1950		80	
95.			1930-1950		15	
96.			2000-2100		60	
97.			2100-2200		220	
98.		Voskepar	1420	SVD	5	
99.		Barekamavan	1545		12	
100.		Eraskh	1840	AK	5	
101.		Mehrab	1930	SVD	11	
102.				AK	9	
103.		Paravaqar	1930-1950	DSHK	25	
104.		Chinari	2000	DSHK	25	
105.			2000-2130	AK	250	
106.				SVD	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
107.				DSHK	50	
108.		Vazashen	2210	SVD	20	
109.		Berdavan	2340	AK	10	
110.	15 April	Paravaqar	0050	AK	15	
111.			0100		10	
112.		Aygepar	0225	SVD	3	
113.			0800	RPK	1	
114.		Berdavan	1140	AK	5	
115.		Vazashen	1700		6	
116.		Barcruni	1725	SVD	1	
117.		Shavarshavan	1835	PK	5	
118.		Omar	2100-2130		15	
119.	16 April	Paravaqar	0120	AK	8	
120.		Chinari	0325	AK	5	
121.			1800	SVD	3	
122.		Vazashen	1100	AK	2	
123.		Barekamavan	1120	PK	25	
124.			1500		15	
125.		Sarigyugh	1500	AK	10	
126.		Dovegh	1520	SVD	6	
127.		Aygepar	1920	AK	2	
128.			2335		5	
129.		Eraskh	2210		4	
130.	17 April	Berqaber	0030	AK	20	
131.		Sarigyugh	0130		25	
132.		Aygepar	0300	AK	6	
133.			1345	PK	6	
134.		Chinari	1000	AK	300	
135.			1230	SVD	2	
136.				AK	4	
137.			1630	AK	7	

No	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
138.				SVD	3	
139.			1710	SVD	1	
140.				AK	7	
141.			1800	AK	2	
142.				PK	300	
143.			1815	AK	12	
144.		Barekamavan	1245	SVD	10	
145.			1340		10	
146.			1415		10	
147.			1530		20	
148.		Chambarak	1915	AK	3	
149.		Berdavan	2020	RPK	12	
150.		Paravaqar	2310	AK	1	
151.		Khndzorut	2310	SVD	1	
152.	18 April	Aygepar	1310	SVD	1	
153.			2010	PK	13	
154.		Paravaqar	1345	AK	1	
155.			1750		3	
156.		Berdavan	1640		3	
157.		N.Karmiraghbyur	1815		5	
158.		Khndzorut	2030-2050	AK	14	
159.				PK	7	
160.		Berqaber	2140	AK	3	
161.	19 April	Movses	1030	PK	7	
162.		Barekamavan	1520	SVD	3	
163.		Aygepar	2045	AK	1	
164.			2220		2	
165.		Eraskh	2305		3	
166.	20 April	Berdavan	0330	AK	10	
167.		Aygepar	1130		4	
168.			2350		2	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
169.		N.Karmiraghbyur	1145	SVD	3	
170.		Paravaqar	1415	AK	5	
171.			1645	PK	5	
172.			1650	AK	10	
173.			2115		8	
174.		Movses	2325		14	
175.	21 April	Sarigyugh	1100	DSHK	12	
176.				PK	20	
177.			1130	SVD	4	
178.		Berdavan	1400	AK	100	
179.		Berqaber	1800	SVD	15	
180.		Vazashen	1900		2	
181.	22 April	Aygepar	0150	AK	4	
182.			0755		7	
183.			0930		1	
184.			0935	SVD	1	
185.		Movses	0210	PK	4	
186.			2340		1	
187.		Eraskh	0500	AK	2	
188.		Chinari	1250	RPK	10	
189.		N.Karmiraghbyur	2340	AK	30	
190.				DSHK	1	
191.	23 April	Berdavan	1600	DSHK	4	
192.		Voskepar	1645	AK	2	
193.		Khndzorut	2110	PK	27	
194.			2125	AK	8	
195.			2130	PK	7	
196.		Vazashen	2315	AK	6	
197.			2315		15	
198.	24 April	Chinari	0050	SVD	1	
199.				PK	15	

No	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
200.			1800	PK	9	
201.			1800	RPK	4	
202.		Berdavan	2030	AK	16	
203.			2040	PK	16	
204.			2100		40	
205.		Sarigyugh	2355	SVD	2	
206.				PK	25	
207.	25 April	Kiranc	0010	PK	15	
208.		Berqaber	1330	SVD	2	
209.			2040	AK	2	
210.		Chinari	1545		30	
211.		Movses	2000		2	
212.		Khachik	2330		3	
213.	26 April	Mehrab	1215	AK	1	
214.			1920	SVD	1	
215.		Baghanis	1530	AK	4	
216.			1540		7	
217.		Movses	1540		3	
218.		Aygepar	2040		10	
219.	27 April	Berdavan	0015	AK	5	
220.		Chinari	0340	AK	8	
221.				SVD	8	
222.			2030	PK	8	
223.			2030	AK	30	
224.		Berqaber	1315	SVD	2	
225.		Aygepar	1630	AK	2	
226.		Dovegh	2115		5	
227.			2135		17	
228.			2205		4	
229.			2215		60	
230.		Mehrab	2350	AK	4	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
231.	28 April	Movses	0015	AK	8	
232.			1615	Black arrow	2	
233.		Dovegh	1145	AK	2	
234.			1455		3	
235.		Aygepar	1430	SVD	1	
236.		Chinari	1810	Black arrow	3	
237.				PK	10	
238.			2035	PK	7	
239.			2040	RPK	15	
240.			2305	Black arrow	8	
241.				PK	20	
242.				SVD	12	
243.				AK	40	
244.		Berdavan	1820	PK	4	
245.			2215	SVD	5	
246.	29 April	Chinari	0230	PK	20	
247.				SVD	10	
248.			2150	Black arrow	1	
249.				PK	25	
250.		Aygepar	0405	AK	1	
251.			0430		3	
252.		Berqaber	1110	Black arrow	2	
253.			1150		1	
254.		Dovegh	2050	AK	2	
255.		Eraskh	1650		3	
256.		Mehrab	1805	SVD	4	
257.		Voskepar	1855	AK	4	
258.			2205	SVD	5	
259.			2310	AK	20	
260.		Barekamavan	1945		2	
261.		Movses	2215		1	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
262.			2245	AK	10	
263.		Sarigyugh	2300	PK	30	
264.				AK	30	
265.	30 April	Chinari	1930	DSHK	5	
266.				Black arrow	6	
267.		Dovegh	1540	PK	5	
268.				SVD	1	

United Nations A/68/899–S/2014/384

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 June 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 53
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 1 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the concept note for the Security Council open debate on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping operations: new trends" to be held on 11 June 2014 under the presidency of the Russian Federation in the Security Council (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 53, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

14-54450 (E) 040614 040614

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Annex to the letter dated 1 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

United Nations peacekeeping operations: new trends

Concept note

In its capacity as President of the Security Council, the Russian Federation will hold an open debate entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations: new trends" on 11 June 2014. During this event, which will include the Security Council members, the broader United Nations membership, including troop- and police-contributing countries, and the United Nations Secretariat, a lively exchange of views is expected on one of the most pressing and relevant areas of the world organization's work. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will deliver an address.

The evolution in United Nations approaches to peacekeeping has been determined, above all, by the changing nature of the conflicts that the Organization must address. Today, unlike during the era of "classic" peacekeeping, the vast majority of crises in which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed or their mandates extended are non-international armed conflicts, often referred to as internal or intra-State conflicts (generally involving a confrontation between government forces and non-State armed groups). The causes of these conflicts and their complicating factors are many and varied, but generally speaking, they have one thing in common: the key to their settlement lies in national reconciliation. The sole exception would be cases where there are terrorist organizations and transnational armed groups present that may have an interest in the existence of a power vacuum at the national level and that have no concerns or interests inside the country where they are operating.

While peacekeeping operations are often deployed to resolve such intra-State conflicts, what is new is that now they often have no choice but to act in circumstances where there is little or no peace to keep and where peacekeepers may face non-traditional threats and heightened security risks. The conventional wisdom is that, in such circumstances, greater international engagement can, at the very least, provide a stabilizing impulse. Under these circumstances, there is a growing need to take into account the readiness of troop-contributing countries to take on such elevated risks. Moreover, it is frequently the case that the United Nations "blue helmets" are deployed alongside foreign military contingents already in the field (from either individual States or regional organizations), regional and international envoys, or special missions. This creates additional challenges, as well as opportunities for closer partnerships.

1. One of the milestones for United Nations peacekeeping along this path was the adoption in March 2013 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) extending the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and establishing within the Mission an Intervention Brigade authorized to use force preventively and to carry out targeted offensive operations. A short time later, the Security Council adopted resolution 2100 (2013) on the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Mali. Considering

the specific threats present in that country, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, including deterring threats and taking active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to key population centres. Earlier fairly common mandates stipulating the use of "all necessary means/actions" should also be taken into account. In some cases, peacekeepers used a greater degree of force; the actions of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire under Security Council resolution 1933 (2010) are an example of that.

These new circumstances of United Nations peacekeeping do not seem to be fully in line with, and in some cases may even run counter to, the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. It is clear that the problem should be appropriately reflected in peacekeeping instruments negotiated by Member States. In the meantime, we are dealing with a fragmented approach to trends that are gaining momentum.

The Organization, as embodied by the Secretariat and the Member States, with the troop-contributing countries playing a key role, will inevitably face the challenge of clearly and effectively formulating positions on a wide range of issues related to "robust" operations, assessment of their effectiveness and the impact on the image of the Organization. This applies, inter alia, to a well-defined rationale and a clear understanding of their purpose and actions (including such issues as "Whose side should we take?" and "How do we ensure strong efforts to promote national reconciliation?") When one of the parties to an internal conflict is the Government, overcoming the clash between the principle of host country consent and that of impartiality is very difficult, as the situations of a number of current missions have demonstrated. The definition of clear and timely stabilization strategies and military concepts, the scope of the use of force, effective leadership and command, and generating the necessary forces and assets, including proper training and logistical support for peacekeeping forces, are critical. There is also a need to reflect on the new challenges that will inevitably arise in the work of United Nations personnel, including humanitarian personnel, who are present in the field along with peacekeeping operations.

In these new conditions, the issue of security for peacekeepers becomes increasingly pressing, particularly in situations where threats to peacekeepers originate with non-State armed groups. A possible increase in casualties among peacekeepers through their direct participation in hostilities is also a source of serious concern (although current statistics show that casualties are mainly attributable to situations of self-defence). Member States and the United Nations Secretariat will need to have a serious discussion to clarify issues related to the loss of peacekeepers' special protected status under international humanitarian law and legal aspects of their responsibility for violation of that law.

Moreover, peacekeepers must have the necessary equipment, security perimeters, vehicles and other items that would enable them to operate safely. This could, however, lead to resource costs, which must be discussed in the relevant intergovernmental bodies.

2. The question of resources and the operational and technical strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including through the use of high-tech equipment, is also, to some extent, related to the new, "ambitious" mandates. All the more so as there is growing recognition that advanced technology (including

unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles and the latest in medical and engineering equipment) can contribute to the fuller implementation of mandates by peacekeepers and improved safety and security of personnel, as well as better situational awareness. Such positive elements were mentioned in the recent briefing by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Security Council.

However, despite an overall positive attitude to the idea of upgrading peacekeeping operations, discussion of specific new technologies, especially unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles, has pointed to a number of issues in the political, legal and budgetary areas. There are concerns on monitoring information received and ensuring its confidentiality. The practice of deploying unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has also revealed problems related to timing and economic and operational effectiveness, as well as related human resources issues. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2013/44), the President of the Security Council noted that in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo "external imagery/electronic equipment and associated analysis capabilities, notably surveillance capability such as that provided by unmanned aerial systems, may be used ... to enhance situational awareness, if available, on a case-by-case basis and without prejudice to the ongoing consideration by relevant United Nations bodies of legal, financial and technical implications of the use of unmanned aerial systems."

To date, such a discussion in the relevant intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations has been extremely fragmented in nature, but the time has come for the Organization to develop a balanced approach, including in the form of policy documents.

There is no doubt that all United Nations peacekeeping operations should have the necessary resources, including the tools and capabilities, to fulfil their mandates. One model that has seen intensive development recently is the temporary movement of personnel and equipment between missions to fill gaps in capacity, for example, when a situation deteriorates sharply. That mechanism has proven effective in a number of cases. However, inter-mission cooperation should not affect the quality of the delivery of each mission's mandates, the security of peacekeepers or the level of budgetary discipline. There is also the question of troop-contributing countries' willingness to deliver capacity and resources to carry out tasks in more difficult settings or in settings that are simply different.

3. Contemporary multi-component mission mandates have become more complex and include, in addition to the tasks of restoring security in the host countries, multiple peacebuilding tasks, up to and including the integrated restoration of statehood in the broadest sense of the word. Recent experience prompts us to ask whether the Organization is capable, from both the political and resource standpoints, of assuming the full range of tasks all at once, especially in cases where conflict is cyclical and characterized by periods of dramatic deterioration of the security situation. It appears that in some cases there is a need to set priorities in the mandates through the sequencing of tasks, so that when missions are overburdened there is no impact on their ability to maintain security and facilitate the political process and national reconciliation.

These points do not, of course, represent an exhaustive list of new trends in United Nations peacekeeping, but perhaps encompass those that are most pressing and that most strongly affect its qualitative transformation. The fragmented nature

of the inter-State policy and legal framework dictates the need to continue active discussions among Member States, the development of the relevant doctrines and, in the foreseeable future, the elaboration and adoption of policy instruments in the light of lessons learned.

There is no doubt that the central role in the formulation of such decisions by Member States and in providing guidance to the Secretariat on general peacekeeping issues falls to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly. Logistical, budgetary and staffing matters should be discussed in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. Productive discussion in those bodies is necessary for the Security Council to take informed decisions in developing the individual mandates of peacekeeping missions, taking into account the views of troop-contributing countries and the situation on the ground.

Inclusive interaction within the framework of the General Assembly and the Security Council will provide the Secretariat with the necessary guidance and strengthen the strategic partnership in United Nations peacekeeping, whose main virtues are its universal character and unique legitimacy.

The feasibility of developing a possible outcome document will be determined on the basis of the upcoming open debate.

United Nations S/2014/385

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 June 2014

Original: English

Identical letters dated 2 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Last month, Israel celebrated its anniversary as a free and independent nation. In its 66-year history, Israel has not known a single day free from the threat of terrorism. Today, millions of Israeli citizens continue to live under the constant danger of rocket fire.

Over the past four weeks, Israelis were the victims of four separate rocket attacks launched from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Since 2005, Gaza has become a terrorist base used by terrorist groups to shoot rockets, build terror tunnels and launch attacks on Israeli citizens.

Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, may seek the veneer of legitimacy by partnering with the Palestinian Authority, but it is clear that the terrorist group remains committed to destroying Israel. While Hamas and the Palestinian Authority celebrate their new unity government, the international community must be united in condemning terrorist attacks. Those who continue to commend this partnership are, in fact, lending legitimacy to terror attacks against Israel.

Israel has thus far shown considerable restraint, but it will not allow its citizens to be the ongoing victims of attacks and will continue to take all necessary measures to protect its population. Last week, the Security Council met to address the efforts made by the international community to combat terrorism. In the face of the threats faced by Israel, the Council must demonstrate resolve by clearly and unequivocally condemning the terrorist attacks aimed at Israel.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-54473 (E) 060614

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United Nations A/68/901–S/2014/386

General Assembly
Security Council

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4 June 2014
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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 70 (a)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 2 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith a press release issued by the High Relief Commission in the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 2 June 2014, regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) and the Syrian humanitarian response plan (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 70 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 2 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

The High Relief Commission has been implementing the country's humanitarian response and assistance plan in the context of the ongoing efforts of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate in every way humanitarian access to all regions of Syria. On Monday, 2 June 2014, the Commission cooperated with international organizations to deploy several humanitarian aid convoys of food and medical supplies to a number of Syrian governorates, particularly areas besieged by armed terrorist groups, such as the countryside outside Damascus, Aleppo, Idlib and Dar'a. Examples are Duma, Bab Bila and Bludan in Rif Dimashq; Binnish, Ma'arrat Misrin and Armanaz in the Idlib countryside; Yadudah, Ibta', Basr al-Harir in the Dar'a countryside; and Urum al-Kubra, Urum al-Sughra, Kafr Ta'al and Ibzimu in the Aleppo countryside.

The Commission has also been working to document the violations committed by armed terrorist groups. The Chair of the Commission and Minister of Social Affairs, Kindah al-Shammat, has announced the publication of the Commission's detailed report on the situation at Aleppo Central Prison and the violations that were committed while the prison and its inmates were besieged by the armed groups. The report disproves the allegations that have been disseminated regarding the situation at the prison.